General Assembly makes any "intrusions" on the Indiana Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law, the legislature must do so in express terms and with clear and unmistakable language. A Florida-based 6 limited partnership sought to provide consumer advocacy services for homeowners facing foreclosure in Indiana; however, they never obtained a license to practice law in Indiana. Instead, the partnership associated with Indiana-licensed attorneys to provide legal representation. An attorney general 8 investigation of consumer complaints resulted in a lawsuit against the limited partnership for violations of various state laws governing credit services, mortgage fraud, and deceptive consumer sales practices, but the suit did not name any of the Indiana attorneys.
9
The court of appeals found the Indiana Credit Services Organization Act 10 failed to expressly intrude upon the supreme court's authority to police lawyers and their firms. Thus, due to the partnership's affiliation with Indiana lawyers, 11 it was exempt from the statute. Although the law did not exempt law firms-just 12 attorneys-the court recognized that "clear and unmistakable language" was required for the General Assembly to show that it did not "entrust our supreme court to adequately police lawyers and their firms in this area." The court's 13 construction of the law avoided an executive branch intrusion upon the supreme court's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of attorneys and what could have been a significant conflict between the executive and judicial branches of the government.
In Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana vs. Koch, the Indiana Supreme Court 14 held the Indiana Access to Public Records Act ("APRA") applies to the General Assembly and its members, but the determination of whether certain correspondence constituted work product was a non- request on the basis that the APRA did not apply to the General Assembly.
17
As initial matters, the supreme court held it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and that APRA applied to the General Assembly. Under article 7, 18 section 4, the supreme court "shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as specified by rules" and Rule 4 of the Indiana Appellate Rules gave the court "discretionary jurisdiction over cases in which it grants Transfer under Rule 56." The court distinguished subject matter jurisdiction 19 from justiciability, which is the "quality or state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court." Because the court granted transfer under Rule 56, 20 the court had subject matter jurisdiction. 21 However, article 3, section 1's separation of powers principles gave the court the ability to find an issue non-justiciable. For "prudential reasons," the court noted it could leave a question to another branch of government. But the court 22 deemed the question of whether the APRA applies to the General Assembly and its members justiciable. No constitutional provision expressly reserved to the 23 legislative branch the authority to determine whether a statute applies to the legislature. Although the General Assembly could create an exception by statute 24 or rule, it failed to exercise that power. Indeed, the exception for "work product 25 of individual members and the partisan staff of the general assembly" clearly contemplated that the APRA applied to the General Assembly and its members. 26 But the court then found the central claim regarding whether documents were exempt from disclosure as legislative work product non-justiciable. The General
27
Assembly did not define "work product" and so if the court were to define "work product," it could result in court-ordered disclosure of records under a courtcreated rule. The court held finding otherwise would violate the separation of 28 powers by the court intruding on the General Assembly's core power to define work product. Justice Rucker concurred in part, agreeing the APRA applied to the legislature and the court had subject matter jurisdiction, but dissented on the basis that the merits of the work product exemption were never addressed by the trial court, the supreme court, or the parties. Thus, the court weighed in on a 30 significant separation of powers issues without an adequate record. 31 In State v. Buncich, the supreme court held an abnormal number of small 32 precincts in the county was a sufficiently distinct defining characteristic to justify a special law to create a committee to consolidate precincts. The court also held 33 precinct committee persons at risk of being eliminated by the committee were not state officers within the ambit of separation of powers doctrine because they did not perform state government functions.
34
A state law, Indiana Code section 3-11-1.5-3.4, created the "Small Precinct Committee" for Lake County to identify precincts with fewer than 500 active voters for purposes of consolidation and reduction of election costs. Precinct 35 committeepersons at risk for elimination sued the State challenging the statute.
36
Under article 4, section 23, the General Assembly is instructed that "where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State." The court placed emphasis on the word "can" 37 and found that the provision's purpose was to prevent the General Assembly from providing benefits or imposing burdens on a single locality and not others in attempt to prevent "logrolling" and "an irregular system of laws." But there are 38 cases where general laws cannot be made applicable statewide and this was one of them. Under the two-step analysis of determining (1) whether the law was general or special and (2) if it is a special law, whether it is a constitutionally permissible special law, the court determines whether the act's subject is amenable to a general law of uniform operation through the State, and if so, deems it constitutional. The court found Lake County's inherent characteristics 39 of "an exceptionally high number of small precincts" imposing "significant and unnecessary costs on the election system" was sufficient to not second-guess the legislature's decision "not to set up a Small Precinct Committee in counties that don't need it." Lake County not only had a high number of small precincts, it The plaintiff, a wholesaler of beer and wine, argued that being prohibited from wholesaling liquor violated the equal privileges and immunities clause.
71
The court of appeals held the disparate treatment alleged by plaintiff failed to include a similarly situated and preferentially treated group. Without reaching 72 the two-pronged Collins test, the court of appeals found the Indiana law treated all persons and all alcohol wholesalers alike-anyone who wants to wholesale alcohol must simply choose which type of alcohol it wants to wholesale. The 73 law treats each the same at the time of the decision and afterward-all beer and liquor wholesalers are equally prohibited from obtaining permits to distribute any other alcohol except for wine. "There can be no The court also found the statute conflicted with the second element of the Collins analysis. With two similarly situated classes of asbestos victims, one 93 could only seek damages from defendants who mined and sold asbestos while the other was exempt. Because nearly all class members suffered from a ten-plus 94 year latency period, and all class members were exposed to products containing asbestos, the two classes' unconstitutional treatment violated the equal privileges and immunities clause. 95 Chief Justice Rush dissented on that basis that the court's decision created the "perception" that it would reverse close and controversial decisions based on "a third vote for the opposing view." The court's authority rested on the rule of 96 law, "a fragile thing" that is earned "by showing stability and consistency in our 97 judgments and integrity in our processes." 98 In slight contrast to Chief Justice Rush's belief that the decision was "not a catastrophe," Justice Massa suggested that he agreed with much of Chief Justice 99 Rush's dissent including "perhaps" the fact that the sky was not falling. Justice 100 Massa believed the decision had "the potential to more than chip away at the rule of law and inflict more serious damage on our court and state." Justice Massa overruling Ott "clever" but ultimately unconvincing. 
113
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding the synthetic drug law and a look-a-like statute were not unconstitutionally vague.
114
The General Assembly was attempting to regulate a field of advanced chemistry that required the use of technical terms-article 4, section 20 only prohibited the use of technical terms to the extent "practicable." The defendant contended that 115 the "statutory maze" made it impossible to know how to act. However, the 116 117 court refuted this contention by stating that the "three discrete statutes . . . give clear guidance as to how to find everything falling within the definition of 'synthetic drug.'" Furthermore, the look-a-like statute required scienter, 118 defeating any vagueness challenge.
119
The court also held that delegating to the Pharmacy Board authority to add drugs to the controlled substances list was not an impermissible delegation of legislative authority.
The court found no guidance from the Indiana The court of appeals reversed because it found the amendment's purpose was public safety, not punishment. Under article 1, section 24, "[n]o ex post facto 146 law . . . shall ever be passed." The State did not dispute that the application of 147 the law here created an ex post facto effect, but argued that the result-the suspension of driving privileges-served the interests of public safety, not punishment.
The court found the amendment was procedural rather than 148 substantive and therefore could be applied to crimes committed before the effective date because it changed neither the elements of the crime nor enlarged the punishment. Rather, the legislature had merely explained the "method of 149 enforcing" the designation and sought to protect the public by regulating McVey's conviction was for conduct against a child whereas it was unknown whether a child was involved in the conviction in Pollard. confirmed to be Hydrocodone for which the driver lacked a valid prescription.
192
Because there was no dispute that the arrest and the pat-down were lawful, under the Litchfield reasonableness factors, the court addressed whether the search of the pill container was "reasonable" under the Indiana Constitution. Here, the court found the officer needed no additional degree of suspicion in opening the container.
A search incident to arrest permits a "relatively Garcia is notable for its heavy reliance on U.S. Supreme Court precedent to analyze the Litchfield reasonableness factors. The court noted although the federal interpretation of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not binding on the court's article 1, section 11 analysis, the court was satisfied that it reached the same conclusion. silence when his attorney requested a bench trial was insufficient to waive the right to a jury trial. The court's decision rested on article 1, section 13 of the 251 Indiana Constitution, which the court recognized "provides greater protection" by requiring the defendant to personally waive the right in a felony prosecution.
252
The court's decision also rested on the statutory right that had remained essentially unchanged since its enactment in 1852, conferring upon the defendant-not counsel-the authority to waive the jury trial right. provides that in all criminal cases "the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts." By defining a "dwelling" to include both a "building, 295 structure, or other enclosed space" and any "place a person keeps personal items with the intent to reside in the near future," the instruction invaded the providence of the jury. 
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By imposing on the definition a specific set of facts-any "place where a person keeps personal items with the intent to reside in the near future"-the instruction decided for the jury what constituted a conviction under the statute.
297
Although an earlier court of appeals decision held such facts could support a conviction for burglary, that did not make the same language appropriate for a jury instruction. 298 Justice Massa dissented on the basis that the trial court was placed in the position of relying either on the statutory text or to "further inform deliberations by incorporating the holding of [the White decision]," the court of appeals decision that found where a person kept his personal belongings constituted a "dwelling" for a burglary conviction. Such a place "is considered a dwelling," 299 and not optional for the jury to deem otherwise. 300 In Williams v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that although an 301 officer's testimony embraced the ultimate issue of guilt and invaded the province of the jury in violation of Indiana Constitution article 1, section 19, the admission of such evidence was nevertheless harmless. Implementing article 1, section 19, 302 Indiana Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits witnesses from testifying as to a defendant's guilt or innocence. Here, the officer's testimony paraphrased all the 303 elements of the offense. These factual assertions went to the ultimate opinion 304 of whether the defendant was guilty, which was for the jury alone to decide.
305
For example, the officer said there was "zero doubt in his mind that" the defendant dealt cocaine. The testimony did not just describe the offense's 306 elements, the testimony encompassed all of the offense's elements including mens rea. Yet admission of the guilt opinion was harmless error because of the 307 substantial, independent evidence supporting the jury's verdict. caused by heavy rainfall did not constitute a taking through inverse condemnation. The plaintiffs claimed that county officials failed to remedy the 310 
